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PUERTO RICO: STATE FORMATION 
IN A COLONIAL CONTEXT 
Pedro A. Caban 
Abstract 
This article examines U.S. Puerto Rico relations during the 
American century through the prism of the colonial state 
and identifies eight periods of fundamental political and 
economic change that altered the conduct of U.S. colonial 
practice in Puerto Rico. These periods witnessed the 
emergence, ascendancy and decline of local political 
coalitions that competed for control of the control state. The 
coalitions articulated distinct economic projects and pursued 
different strategies to resolve Puerto Rico's status as an 
unincorporated territorial possession. Each period was also 
marked by insular economic restructuring precipitated by 
shifts in U.S. fiscal policies and changes in the economy, by 
U.S. congressional efforts to enact legislation to resolve 
Puerto Rico's dependent territorial status, and by changing 
perceptions of hemispheric challenges to U.S. national 
security interests. 
Resumen 
Este articulo examina las relaciones entre Estados Unidos y 
Puerto Rico durante el Siglo Americano a traves del prisma 
del estado colonial e identifica ocho perfodos fundamentales 
de cambio polftico y econ6mico que alteraron Ia practica 
colonial estadounidense en Puerto Rico. Dichos perfodos 
Caribbean Studies 30 (2), 2002. 
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presenciaron el surgirniento, Ia ascendencia y el descenso 
de las coaliciones polfticas locales que competfan por el 
control del estado. Las coaliciones articulaban distintos 
proyectos econ6micos y perseguian diferentes estrategias 
para resolver el status de Puerto Rico como una posesi6n 
territorial no incorporada. Cada periodo estuvo igualmente 
marcado por una restructuraci6n econ6mica insular 
precipitada por los cambios en las polfticas fiscales 
estadounidenses y en los cambios de Ia economia, por 
esfuerzos del Congreso de Estados Unidos para promulgar 
legislaci6n que resolviera el status de Puerto Rico como 
territorio dependiente y por cambios en las percepciones 
bacia los retos hemisfericos a los intereses para Ia seguridad 
nacional de Estados Unidos. 
Resume 
Dans cet article on exainine les rapports entre les Etats-Unis 
et Porto Rico, pendant le Siecle Americain, a travers 
1 'evantail de 1' etat colonial et on identifie huit periodes 
fondamentales de changement politique et economique qui 
ont altere Ia pratique coloniale etasunienne a Porto Rico. 
Ces peri odes ont connu le surgissement, Ia montee et le dec lin 
des coalitions politiques locales qui concurren~aient pour 
le controle del' etat. Les coalitions articulaient divers pro jets 
economiques et poursuivaient des strategies differentes a 
fin de resoudre le statut de Porto Rico, en tant qu'une 
possession territoriale non incorporee. Chaque periode a ete 
egalement marquee par une restructuration economique 
insulaire, precipitee par les changements dans les politiques 
fiscales etasuniennes et les changements de 1' economie, par 
les efforts du Congres des Etats-Unis a promulguer des lois 
qui trouveraient une solution au statut de Porto Rico en tant 
que territoire dependant et par des perceptions changeantes 
des defis Mmispheriques lances aux interets de la securite 
nationale des Etats-Unis. 
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172 PEDRO A. CABAN 
From a highly centralized administration supervised by U.S. army generals, career bureaucrats and carpet bagging 
politicians who relegated local participation to the 
ritualistic and symbolic, the state in Puerto Rico has evolved into 
sprawling bureaucracy with substantial resources. Although still 
a colony, Puerto Rico is administered by popularly elected officials 
who command extensive decision-making powers over local 
affairs. In this article I examine the evolution of the state in Puerto 
Rico and identify eight periods as particularly salient in this 
process. These periods are: ( 1) dismantling and replacing the 
Spanish colonial regime (1898-1900), (2) establishing the colo-
nial state, (1900-16), (3) consolidation and demise (1917-31), 
(4) reworking the colonial formula (1932-40), (5) relative 
autonomy (1941-51), (6) Commonwealth and industrialization 
(1952-68), (7) demise ofELA and annexation (1969-1988), and 
(8) reappraisal of the Commonwealth (1989-2000). 
These periods witnessed the emergence, ascendancy and 
decline oflocal political coalitions that became actively involved 
in the administration of the colonial state. While all political forces 
and coalitions opposed colonialism, each advanced different 
solutions to the island's vexing status as an unincorporated terri-
torial possession. The three positions-statehood, self governance 
and independence-stacked out over a century ago, are still 
advocated by Puerto Rico's dominant political parties. Historically 
those governing coalitions that were able to maintain political 
stability and the legitimacy of U.S. rule were often granted wide 
latitude by the federal government to manage strictly local affairs. 
But whenever these coalitions proved incapable of resolving 
economic and social dislocations that threatened stability, the 
federal government intervened. Typically these crises in colonial 
management corresponded to the demise of the governing 
coalition and the ascendancy of new political forces. 
During each of the eight periods the political fate of these 
coalitions was effected by a combination of factors, which 
included changes in the U.S. domestic political economy, 
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congressional legislation and executive branch decisions on in-
sular affairs, fiscal and trade matters, and hemispheric strategic 
and security considerations. Although it is a simplification, the 
political history of U.S. colonialism in Puerto Rico appears to 
follow a pattern of federal government neglect and inaction 
punctuated by overt engagement when politically salient issues 
emerge. For each of the periods I will review the emergence, 
consolidation and decline of those sectoral coalitions that gained 
control of the state in Puerto Rico, and discuss their performance 
in managing economic change, maintaining stability and 
advancing its status preference. 
Dismantling and Replacing the Spanish Colonial 
System (1898-1900) 
The United States' colonial policy was designed to 
economically incorporate Puerto Rico, the Philippines and Cuba 
into the empire, and to secure the allegiance of their subjugated 
peoples. The War Department administered the possessions until 
a "government which comports with the interests and inclinations 
of the dominant power" was established by Congress (U.S. 
Department of War, Bureau of Insular Affairs, 1902). From 25 
July 1898 through P1 May 1900, Puerto Rico was governed by 
army generals. 
Although U.S. colonial officials agreed that Puerto Rico was 
"in possession of a complete system of local government," they 
decried that it "were so completely at variance with American 
theory an.d practice that it was inevitable that radical changes 
would have to be made at the earliest possible moment" (Edwards 
1904). The military governors lost little time in dismantling the 
system of governance the Spanish had set up in the island. The 
army issued scores of general orders to establish an "organized 
government in harmony with American methods," which would 
promote the Americanization of the colonial subjects (Edwards 
1904:276). The military quickly set up a highly centralized 
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administration that ruled by decree and which was profoundly 
insulated from local political forces (see Go 2000). 
During the brief period of military rule, the War Department 
established a new court system, an insular constabulary and an 
internal revenue system; expanded and modernized the sanitation 
and public health system, and began an accelerated road 
construction program (Berbusse 1966; Caban 1999). The 
governor-generals scuttled the archaic educational system left by 
the Spanish and initiated a system of compulsory mass public 
education that would spearhead the Americanization of Puerto 
Rico's people (Negr6n de Montilla 1971). According to Governor-
General Guy V. Henry, "the work of Americanizing a new colony 
inhabited by an alien people, of a race diametrically opposed to 
the Anglo-Saxon in very many respects," was one of his primary 
responsibilities. His duty was "to encourage native talent in 
adopting our ideas or morals, government and institutions," and 
to "educate those inhabitants of the island to our way of looking 
at things" (Henry 1899). 
The change in sovereignty inaugurated a dramatic 
restructuring of Puerto Rico's economy. The monetary conversion 
that resulted in a significant devaluation of the local currency, 
massive increases in costs of imported capital goods, a new tax 
code, and restrictions on the supply of credit altered the local 
economy. Particularly affected were the coffee hacendados who, 
in addition to suffering devastating losses caused by a terrible 
hurricane in 1898, lost their European markets when Puerto Rico 
was incorporated into the U.S. customs area (Schwartz 1992). 
Given the importance of sugar for the national economy, colo-
nial officials designed policies to erode those social relations of 
production and structure of property ownership that could block 
the arrival of U.S. firms (see Caban 1999). Initially Puerto Rico's 
sugar planters benefited from the arrival of the sugar refiners, 
but gradually they appropriated a substantial portion of the island's 
productive resources and threatened domestic producers. This 
expansion was aided by fiscal and monetary policies designed to 
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integrate Puerto Rico's economy into the metropolitan structure 
of production and trade (Quintero Rivera 1980). While it is certain 
that U.S. capital would have eventually overwhelmed the domestic 
sugar producers and refiners, it is also undeniable that the military 
regimes created the basis for this process to unfold quickly (Ayala 
1999). The economic and institutional policies effected by the 
military regimes appear not to have promoted rural landlessness 
prior to World War I (Ayala and Bergad 2002). However, they set 
the foundations for the eventual displacement of Puerto Rican 
sugar manufacturers and general landlessness during the 1920s 
(Bird 1937). 
By deftly exploiting long-standing ideological and political 
differences between the leadership of Puerto Rico's dominant 
parties, the governor generals were able to frustrate effective 
opposition to their rule. The Federal Party, the more influential 
of Puerto Rico's two political parties, advocated statehood pre-
ceded by a period ofliberal self-government, while the Republican 
Party endorsed colonial tutelage as a preparatory phase for 
statehood. The governor generals appointed members of the 
minority Republican party to titular positions in the administration 
to check the influence of the Federals and establish political 
equivalence between the parties. Popular opposition to the new 
colonizer was also tempered since the rural population harbored 
antipathy and suspicion of the propertied classes who had 
benefited from the same Spanish colonial system that had so 
abused the rural laborers (Pic6 1987). 
So complete was the transformation of Puerto Rico's 
institutions that on the eve of the transition to civilian rule General 
Davis confidently reported: "the new government ordered by 
Congress ... could be launched and carried forward in an efficient 
and economical manner" (Root 1916). After 1900, the civilian 
colonial officials would carry forth the Americanizing mission, 
and U.S. corporations would begin the process of transforming 
the island into a tropical sugar bowl. Congress and the executive 
branch learned much during this brief period of military rule. 
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The lessons learned would be the basis for devising a sophisticated 
colonial policy, not only for Puerto Rico, but for the other 
possessions and Cuba as well. 
Establishing The Colonial State (1900-1916) 
The Foraker Act of 1st. May 1900 was a comprehensive 
measure designed to transform the economic, legal and political 
foundations of Puerto Rico .1 It embraced the British philosophy 
that the colonies must generate their own revenues and create a 
favorable investment climate, including an effective infrastructure 
to attract private capital (Havinden and David 1993). Acoording 
to Charles Allen, Puerto Rico's first civilian governor, the c·osts 
of running the colony had to be from insular sources "without the 
American treasury to rely upon to make up any deficiency" (Wood 
1902). 
The Foraker Act authorized the president to appoint a civilian 
governor who presided over a bicameral legislature that was 
comprised of a locally-elected lower House and aU .S. appointed 
eleven member Executive Council. With singular ideological 
determination, the Executive Council embarked on a compre-
hensive and systematic campaign to complete the task of 
dismantling the governmental and judicial institutions established 
by Spain. The Department of Education continued the America-
nization campaign initiated by the military-run schools. The 
department was crucial in constructing and implanting a new and 
alien world view centered on the prevailing myths of the American 
experience, but completely divorced from the historical context 
of the Puerto Rican people's lived experiences (Guerra 1998). 
The courts and body of Spanish jurisprudence that guided their 
conduct were targeted for systematic change. For some officials 
there was "no more ready or more practical method of 
Americanizing our new possessions than by the enactment and 
enforcement of American laws, and the introduction and practice 
of American jurisprudence" (U.S. Department of State 1904). 
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Colonial officials continued to exploit the distinctive material 
interests and ideologies of Puerto Rico's political parties. These 
officials intruded in their dynamics and worked to alter the 
configuration oflocal political forces. During the seventeen-year 
Foraker period, the Republican Party emerged as a vociferous 
and active political force promoting Americanization and 
annexation of Puerto Rico. The party articulated the interests of 
business sectors and occupational groups that stood to gain from 
economic and institutional modernization. Initially the 
professional strata, lawyers and doctors in particular, comprised 
its leadership, although sugar cane growers and merchants became 
very prominent (Negron Portillo 1981; Quintero River 1977; 
Ramos 1987; Melendez 1988). In contrast, prominent in the 
Federal Party's were sectors linked to Spanish commercial 
interests, especially the coffee hacendados and small coffee 
cultivators. According to colonial officials the party included the 
"more conservative elements of the population" and the "leading 
classes of the country" (Rowe 1902; Negron Portillo 1981b). 
Munoz Rivera concurred noting that the party contained "most 
of the better element of the native planters, commercial men, 
wealthy inhabitants of the city and the educated and refined Porto 
Ricans all over the island" (Munoz Rivera 1899). But in 1904, in 
an effort to undercut the Republican Party's appeal to the 
popular forces, the Federal Party was reorganized as La Union 
Puertorriquefia (Negron Portillo 1981 a). 
Although the economic position of traditional export sectors 
continued to erode, annexation held out the prospects of significant 
material advancement for Puerto Rican men and women of busi-
ness. Given the rapidly expanding demand of sugar in the U.S., 
Puerto Rico's sugar cane growers envisioned stupendous growth 
in demand for their product. Puerto Rican sugar producers, among 
them Spaniards who decided to remain, were beneficiaries of the 
U.S. corporate sugar investments throughout the 1920s. The 
transformation of Puerto Rico into a large scale sugar producer 
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created new economic categories and reconfigured local political 
forces? 
The politics of this formative period ofU .S. rule were framed 
by the competing material interests of different sectors of the 
local bourgeoisie and the expanding professional strata. Politically 
the Union and Republican both advocated statehood, but the 
former demanded autonomy for Puerto Rico if Congress failed 
to act quickly on statehood. The Union sought to shield those 
sectors of domestic capital most threatened by the incipient arrival 
of U.S. capital. The Republicans, on the other hand, welcomed 
the North American investors not only for the new economic 
opportunities they provided. Neither the Republicans nor the 
Union represented the interests of the rapidly growing rural and 
urban working class. The political elite was engaged in political 
battles on two fronts: first, against the U.S. officials as they 
attempted to negotiate access to power, and secondly against its 
own working class that struggled to devise its own political voice 
(Lewis 1963). 
The fast-paced growth of sugar production and tobacco 
processing created a large working. Despite fierce opposition from 
the bourgeois political parties, the Federaci6n Libre de Trabaja-
dores (FLT) spearheaded the organization of the growing labor 
force in the sugar fields and tobacco sheds. The proletarianization 
process was so swift, comprehensive and exploitative that it 
provoke wide-scale industrial conflict. The period from 1900 
through 1917 was marked by an escalation of labor unrest and 
resistance as the sugar and tobacco corporations refused to acce-
de to the workers' demands for higher wages and better working 
conditions (Silvestrini de Pacheco 1979). They faced hostile 
opposition from colonial officials who were determined to pre-
serve industrial peace and corporate profitability during the pre-
World War I era. Only when labor strife threatened to undermine 
political stability and erode corporate profitability did the federal 
government intervene. In March 1912, the U.S. established a 
Bureau of Labor whose lofty purpose was "to promote the welfare 
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of the laboring classes, to protect them from exploitation or unjust 
treatment by their employers or by other persons of capital" (Puer-
to Rico, Bureau of Labor, 1914:495). 
The economic structuring aggressively pursued by the colo-
nial authorities exacerbated preexisting class antagonisms, 
ideological schisms and political ambitions that predated U.S. 
sovereignty over Puerto Rico. Angel Quintero Rivera described 
the unfolding political dynamics as "la politica triangular." 
Political conflict centered among the organized proletariat, the 
landed oligarchy that had been on the verge of establishing its 
ideological hegemony on the eve of the U.S. invasion, and the 
"metropolitan power and classes and social sectors in the colony 
whose interests were identified with its policy" (Quintero Rivera 
1975). In the context of a highly fractured political and economic 
landscape, no unified nationalist movement for colonial 
emancipation could be forged. This divisiveness eased the task 
of colonial authorities to pursue Americanization and Puerto 
Rico's economic transition. Nonetheless, the Union Puertorri-
quefia waged a relentless political and propaganda campaign to 
force Washington to liberalize the Foraker Act. By 1916, 
opposition extended to other sectors of Puerto Rico's political 
leadership, which uniformly voiced its exasperation with 
Washington for failing to expand the scope of local participation 
in the governing process. 
The Foraker Act sought to reconcile a set of ideas that 
emerged from the political and social experience of the American 
people themselves with the economic and strategic imperatives 
of a new expansionist phase in the development of the American 
empire. The result was an ambiguous territorial doctrine that 
established a second class citizenship and which barely passed 
judicial review. The territorial status of Puerto Rico and the 
Philippines, and the constitutional basis for Congressional 
authority to legislate over them were decided by the Supreme 
Court in May 1901. The cases established the legal rationale that 
Puerto Rico was not a nation, a historical community that defined 
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itself, but merely a geographical possession of the United States, 
the rights of whose inhabitants were to be determined by Congress 
(Rivera Ramos 1993:300). 
Consolidation and Demise (1917-1931) 
The 1917 Jones Act was hurriedly passed as a war measure 
in order to quiet the voices of discontent in Puerto Rico on the 
eve of U.S. entry into World War I. By liberalizing the despised 
Foraker Act and conferring collective U.S. citizenship on Puerto 
Ricans, U.S. authorities hoped to silence the growing expressions 
for autonomy and independence. The grant of citizenship served 
to underscore the determination of the U.S. to retain possession 
of its prized colony. The prevailing attitude was uttered by a 
congressman who warned Puerto Ricans that the reason U.S. 
citizenship was granted was "so ... that the independence propa-
ganda be discontinued, and that our sovereignty remain there 
permanently ... Puerto Rico will never go out from under the 
shadow of the Stars and Stripes" (U.S. House 1996:7473). The 
Executive Council was replaced by an elected Senate. Despite 
the change, effective decision-making power remained centralized 
in the office ofthe appointed governor, who worked closely with 
the War Department's Bureau oflnsular Affairs.Nonetheless, by 
dissolving the hated Executive Council, the federal government 
had made an important symbolic concession to the persistent 
advocates of self-government. 
In the midst of the disruptive economic changes, access to 
state power became particularly urgent for the Puerto Rico's 
embattled landed elite. The state became the institution through 
which those sectors who failed to adopt to the new economic 
order could gain influence and power. In the wake of the Jones 
Act, Puerto Rican political parties underwent a seemingly endless 
process of formation, fragmentation, alliance building and 
decomposition. From 1917 to 1928, the autonomy-mindedAlianza 
Puertorriqueiia was the dominant electoral force that unified the 
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Union and disaffected Republicans who were frustrated with their 
party's conservatism. These Republicans warned against the 
denationalization of the economy, the relentless Americanization 
of the population and the systematic marginalization of Puerto 
Ricans from key decision-making center. The Alianza was also 
forged to thwart the Socialists, who were emerging as an 
electorally viable political party committed to annexation (Quin-
tero Rivera 1975:76). In 1928, the Union scuttled its alliance with 
the Republicans and reorganized itself as the Liberal Party. But, 
almost immediately, reform-minded independentistas who 
advocated economic restructuring, agrarian reform and political 
emancipation within a framework of collaboration with the United 
States challenged the old guard. 
Those Republicans who had refused to join the Union in the 
Alianza formed an electoral pact with the Socialist Party. Although 
the Republicans and Socialists were class enemies, they gravitated 
toward each other because of a shared ambition to displace the 
Union, the perennial advocate of Puerto Rican autonomy and 
representative of traditional agrarian interests (see Negron Portillo 
1981a). The Republicans, like the Socialists, were ardent 
annexationists and patriotic advocates of Americanization. Their 
Coalici6n dominated local politics until 1940 and worked closely 
with colonial authorities and the U.S. sugar corporations. The 
Socialist Party essentially relinquished its formative role as the 
independent political expression of the rural proletariat when it 
joined the pro-business Republicans (Garda and Quintero Rive-
ra 1982:105, 114). 
By the late 1920s, Puerto Rico was engulfed in a deep 
political and economic crisis, which was further aggravated by a 
disastrous hurricane that struck the island in 1928. In March 1929, 
the Coalici6n-controlled legislature requested a $100 million 
emergency loan from Washington for economic rehabilitation. 
The Hoover administration's meager allotment of $6 million for 
road rehabilitation, school house construction and loans to rebuild 
the devastated farms utterly failed to arrest the widespread 
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immiseration. The Coalicion clung to power, but in the context 
political disorder, relentless challenges to its rule and economic 
collapse was neither capable of managing the political economy 
nor legitimizing colonial rule. On the eve of Franklin Roosevelt's 
victory, Puerto Rico's political landscape was fragmented into 
highly polarized and deeply antagonistic camps: a newly formed 
Liberal Party that advocated independence, a militant nationalist 
party that called for a radical break from the U.S., a decaying 
autonomy movement, and an entrenched, but vulnerable, 
annexationist coalition that was loyal to the United States (see 
Melendez 1994:104). 
Reworking the Colonial Formula (1932-1940) 
The Roosevelt administration was acutely aware of the 
urgency for economic rehabilitation, agrarian reform and 
emergency relief to arrest the deterioration in the island, and ex-
tended its version of the New Deal to Puerto Rico. The emphasis 
was on reform, relief, rehabilitation. The New Deal not only 
interposed a new dynamic into Puerto Rico's political economy, 
but made evident the need for an alternate approach for managing 
the colony. It sought to curtail the unbridled brutality of market 
forces under the oligopoly of the sugar corporations and promote 
a more rational structure of resource allocation and equity-based 
growth. 
The disastrous economic downturn of the late 1920's 
intensified labor's resolve to extract a measure of economic justice 
from the sugar barons. During the early 1930s, widespread strikes 
and political protest seemed to consume the country. The widening 
destitution and social immiserization continued to chip away at 
the legitimacy of the colonial regime. The Socialist Party and its 
labor wing, the FLT, were unable to impose industrial peace and 
control the militancy of an increasingly restive rank and file. 
Political party interference led to debilitating schisms between 
its politically complacent leadership and the militant rank and 
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file. Conflict over wages and working conditions took on a 
militant, nationalist and anticolonial configuration. In 1934, the 
FLT experienced its most severe challenge when striking workers 
rebelled against the leadership for negotiating an unfavorable 
contract with the Association of Sugar Producers (Taller de For-
macion Polltica 1982). The seeming collusion between the state 
and the corporations inflamed the already torrid state of indus-
trial relations and accelerated the deteriorating political situation. 
In this context of profound disaffection with the established order, 
the Nationalist Party emerged, in the early 1930s, as a militant 
independence movement. With its strident anti-colonial appeals, 
glorification of a nationalist ideal and willingness to resort to 
armed struggle, the Nationalists posed a very real threat to political 
stability (see Ferrao 1990). 
The social and political crisis prompted Roosevelt to create 
the Puerto Rican Policy Commission in 1934 to devise a program 
for restructuring the island's economy. Known as the Chardon 
Plan, the program would diminish the sugar corporations' 
extensive power over Puerto Rico's land and human resources 
through agrarian reform, state-owned and -operated import 
substituting industries, and diversification of agricultural 
production. Not surprisingly the Coalici6n, the Sugar Producers 
Association and influential U.S. politicians waged a vociferous 
opposition campaign and ultimately forced the Roosevelt 
administration to modify the Chardon Plan, which was the basis 
for the Puerto Rican Reconstruction Administration-PRRA-
(see Mathews 1960:244). Since the Coalici6n had proven 
incapable of arresting the political turmoil and social 
decomposition, the PRRA was placed under the authority of the 
U.S. Department of the Interior. The PRRA promoted agrarian 
reform; light manufacturing and public investments in new 
productive activities provoked the sugar corporations. The Coa-
lici6n and its corporate allies denounced the PRRA for usurping 
the powers of the colonial government and marshaled support 
from their congressional allies in Washington to undermine the 
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agency. Despite this resistance, it was evident that the Roosevelt 
administration was exploring alternative approaches to manage 
the troubled colony. 
Although the PRRA did mitigate short -term human suffering 
and temporarily slowed the pace of social dissolution, it failed to 
mollify the militant voices of independence. In 1936, the PRRA 
was purged of its independence-minded Liberals. The cautious 
elder leadership of the Liberal Party, anxious to demonstrate its 
loyalty to the colonial regime, also expelled the independence 
advocates from the party in May 1937 (Mathews 1960:324). 
The dramatic events of the 1930s radically transformed 
politics as usual and gave dissidents in the Liberal Party an 
unparalleled opportunity to shatter the hold of the traditional elites. 
In 1939, the expelled liberals united under the political leadership 
of Luis Mufioz Marin to form the Partido Popular Democratico 
(PPD). The PPD's unexpected electoral achievement in 1940 was 
an incontestable expression of popular discontent with the 
prevailing political leadership. The Roosevelt administration 
supported the PPD because it advocated an equitable model of 
capitalist growth within the colonial framework. 
Relative Autonomy (1940-51) 
The 1940s was a decade of rapid economic restructuring 
and political transformation. During this period the material and 
institutional foundations were firmly established for a post war 
transition to a manufacturing-based economy. Under the direction 
of the PPD the state acquired a new role as an agent for economic 
reform and emerged as a highly effective legitimator of the 
prevailing colonial relationship. In the aftermath of the 1930s' 
crisis and ensuing leadership vacuum, the PPD appeared as the 
only viable force that could command the popular support required 
to stabilize the troubled colony (Baldrich 1981). For the U.S. 
officials, whose eyes were turned to the conflagration in Europe, 
stability in strategically significant Puerto Rico was a priority. In 
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order to attain its security goals in the Caribbea,n, the federal 
government worked with the PPD, but stifled its radical impulses. 
The Populares appealed to a broad spectrum of society, but 
relied heavily on poor rural workers, impoverished farmers and 
remnants of the once prominent hacendados. The PPD 
campaigned against the excesses of the absentee sugar 
corporations while it called for more socially responsible and 
equitable route to development. 
Puerto Rican scholars have postulated that by using the 
power of the state, the PPD sought to restore a measure of national 
control over the trajectory of economic growth. Quintero Rivera 
observed that the PPD-orchestrated industrialization program was 
the product of the aspirations of the displaced hacendado class 
who hoped to promote a project of autonomous national capitalist 
development in which they could reassert their control over 
society's productive forces (Quintero Rivera 1981, 1988). Santana 
Rabell conjectured that when the PPD came to power in 1940 the 
country lacked a powerful domestic bourgeoisie that had the 
"objective capacity" to direct a project of national capitalism. 
Once U.S. capital had established its dominance over the local 
economy in the 1920s and 1930s, it "exhausted the material 
possibilities for the development of a powerful national 
bourgeoisie." The PPD "had no alternative but to associate itself 
in a dependent and subordinate manner to North American capi-
tal," and strove to control the colonial state in order to exercise 
some direction over Puerto Rican society (Santana Rabell 
1984:61' 170). 
Governor Rexford Guy Tugwell, a member of Roosevelt's 
New Deal brain trust, was a strong advocate of planning and a 
Keynesian-style state regulation of market forces whose ideas on 
institutional modernization and economic reform influenced the 
development goals of the PPD (Padilla 1970; Tugwell 1970). 
Thus, although the PPD decried the evils of absentee corporations, 
its ideology and agenda for economic reconstruction were in 
This content downloaded from 169.226.86.33 on Tue, 18 Apr 2017 16:15:17 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
186 PEDRO A. CABAN 
keeping with the New Deal spirit and its reformist thrust. On 28 
November 1940, Luis Mufioz Marin assured President Roosevelt 
that "economically and administratively our purposes are parallel 
to those of the New Deal, as applied to the Puerto Rican condition" 
(Centro de Estudios Puertorriquefios 1986:15). 
With the start of World War II, non-sugar private external 
capital investments virtually evaporated and normal trade was 
severely disrupted. Fortunately for the PPD, the war-induced 
market distortions were beneficial to its development strategy. 
Revenues to finance a broad array of reforms, infrastructure 
modernization and bureaucratic expansion came from excise taxes 
and extraordinary expenditures for military construction projects. 
This revenue explosion provided the PPD with much of the 
financial wherewithal for its ambitious reform program. From 
approximately 1940 to 194 7, the PPD pursued an inward-oriented 
development strategy that encompassed state capitalism and 
agrarian reform. 
According to economist James Dietz, during the 1940s "the 
colonial state performed the functions of a collective capitalist: it 
took risks and accumulated capital; it invested, made plans and 
carried them out" (Dietz 1986: 186). During this period the sugar 
corporations had little choice, given their waning political 
influence, to cede the policy arena to the PPD. The passage of the 
Jones Costigan Law revealed the weakening political influence 
of the sugar lobby. The law, which was enacted over the opposition 
of Governor Blanton Winship and Puerto Rican Sugar Producers 
Association (Mathews 1960: 144-145), imposed limitations on 
Puerto Rican sugar imported to the U.S. 
Although somewhat politically humbled in Washington, 
locally the sugar corporations preserved their dominance over 
the economy during the war years. In fact, the sugar corporations 
were an important component of the PPD's economic program 
since their refineries relied on Puerto Rican growers ( colonos) to 
supply the bulk oftheir cane. As late as 1948, approximately 75 
percent of the raw sugar produced by four U.S. absentee sugar 
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corporations was purchased from cane cultivated by independent 
farmers. The import quotas had not lessened Puerto Rico's 
dependence on the crop as its primary source of earnings, which 
grew by over 35 percent from 1940 to 1946, while raw sugar 
production increased by comparable amounts. These production 
increases took place as the corporations imposed labor force 
reductions of 32 percent during this period (Perl off 1950:7 5, 401). 
Through the agrarian reform program the PPD attempted to 
increase the amount of sugar cane lands held by Puerto Ricans in 
order to reduce landless and increase income, while expanding 
the party's political base (see Pantojas Garcfa 1990). 
The PPD acted quickly to gain self governing powers for 
Puerto Rico by arguing that self rule was essential for the effective 
management of insular affairs. In 1943, the PPD-controlled 
legislative assembly signed a concurrent resolution demanding 
that at war's end Puerto Ricans be granted the right to exercise 
self determination (Trias Monge 1997:103). In the same year 
President Roosevelt set up an executive level committee to exa-
mine ways "to reinforce the machinery of self-government in 
Puerto Rico." He also called on Congress to amend the Jones Act 
to permit Puerto Ricans to elect their own governor and to 
"redefine the functions and powers" of both governments (Hunter 
1966: 102-103). Both of these initiatives were seen as indications 
that Washington was pleased with the PPD's handing of colonial 
matters. 
While the PPD was able to operate with a measure of 
autonomy during the interregnum, the fragile and conjunctural 
foundations of its experiment in state capitalism and reform 
became painfully apparent after the war. The economy 
immediately confronted serious problems. Unemployment rose, 
revenues from wartime sources fell to prewar levels, demand for 
sugar declined, industrial production stagnated while the 
population had grown by over a quarter million. In 1947, the 
U.S. Tariff Commission dealt the PPD 's program for equity-based 
development a fatal blow when it concluded Puerto Rico could 
This content downloaded from 169.226.86.33 on Tue, 18 Apr 2017 16:15:17 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
188 PEDRO A. CABAN 
not survive economically as a sovereign nation (Baver 1993:14-
15; Maldonado 1997:52-55). The post war economic down tum, 
political opposition in Washington to state ownership of 
productive resources and market regulation, and the Commission's 
devastating prognosis left the PPD with little choice but to 
abandon its inward oriented growth plan. When World War II 
came to an end, so did the brief period of state capitalism and 
land redistribution. 
PPD planners devised an alternative program of 
industrialization by invitation that was dubbed Operation 
Bootstrap. In 1948, Luis Munoz Marin, now governor, reorganized 
the state bureaucracy with the aim of effecting the transition to a 
growth strategy based on U.S. investments. Planning, industrial 
promotion, infrastructure development and program implemen-
tation were centralized in the governor's office (Puerto Rico: 
Office of the Governor 1949). The newly established planning 
board allowed the governor to coordinate all phases of the 
economic program and to adjust it according to changing 
economic needs and conditions (Stead 1958: 14). A labor 
bureaucracy was set up to monitor and mediate industrial labor 
relations, regulate wages and train union leaders in collective 
bargaining. These policies were designed to convince U.S. 
investors that the PPD would establish the requisite industrial 
peace necessary for industrialization (Caban 1989). 
By the late 1940s, the PPD had devised the institutional 
framework to effect transition to a manufacturing economy in 
which U.S. capital would have a decisive role.lts strategy was to 
guarantee greater profitability in Puerto Rico for manufacturers 
than competing industrial centers in the United States. PPD 
planners seemingly anticipated the trajectory of postwar economic 
restructuring in the U.S. and devised a strategy to insert Puerto 
Rico into this new order. Through its control of the colonial state, 
the PPD had the power to create a favorable investment climate 
for U.S. firms. In the process the PPD continued to legitimize the 
colonial relationship. The implication of the industrialization 
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program was clear: Puerto Rico's post war development would 
rely almost exclusively on U.S. capital and markets. While low 
wages and tax incentives were important, political stability was 
essential for the success of Operation Bootstrap. The PPD expelled 
members who advocated independence and suppressed the 
Nationalist Party in an effort to eliminate sources of political 
dissension and conflict. Moreover, in coordination with the fede-
ral government, the PPD promoted the emigration of labor that 
was displaced in the transition from agriculture to manufacturing 
(History Task Force 1979). 
In the aftermath of the war, the U.S. became a driving force 
for global decolonization, but its claim to moral leadership was 
obviously compromised since it held Puerto Rico as a non-self 
governing territorial possession. In order to blunt international 
criticism over Puerto Rico, Congress enacted two measures that 
seemingly granted Puerto Rico self-governing powers: the 
Elective Governor Act of 1947 and Public Law 81-600 (3 July 
1950). The latter set a procedure for establishing a republican 
form of local government in Puerto Rico with its own consti-
tution.3 Subsequent to its approval of Puerto Rico's constitution, 
the United States informed the United Nations that Puerto Rico 
was a self-governing territory that had freely entered into a 
compact with the United States. According to Mufioz Marin, the 
new relationship was a compact of free association based on the 
principle of consent which took "away from the very basis of the 
relationship the nature and onus of colonialism. It cannot be 
revoked or changed unilaterally" (Borg 1975:7). Nonetheless, 
Congress asserted it retained constitutional authority to alter the 
compact, annul the Puerto Rican constitution or "veto any insu-
lar legislation which it deems unwise or improper" (Helfeld 
1952:307). In 1997, Congress reaffirmed that the "arrangement 
(P.L. 81-600) for local territorial government has not changed 
Puerto Rico's status as an unincorporated territory subject to the 
plenary authority of Congress under the Territorial Clause" (U.S. 
House 1997). Neither did ELA alter the laws that had locked 
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Puerto Rico into the U.S. circuit of production and trade since 
1917.4 
Commonwealth and Industrialization (1952-68) 
The Estado Libre Asociado (ELA) was proclaimed on 25 
July 1952 and presented to the United Nations as signifying the 
end of Puerto Rico's colonial status. In a bipolar postwar world 
in which national security was threatened by communist 
expansion, the concept of ELA as a territorial arrangement that 
straddled statehood and independence appealed to U.S. policy 
makers. ELA and the ascendancy of the PPD signified for these 
policy makers that the interminable struggle between the 
independence and statehood advocates had been superseded. ELA 
retained the most economically attractive features of the colonial 
relationship-exemption from federal regulations and taxation, 
duty free access to U.S. markets and monetary system. Congress 
further enhanced Puerto Rico's investment climate by amending 
the internal revenue code to permit U.S. corporations that 
established plants in the island to repatriate their profits tax free 
upon liquidation of their operations. ELA enhanced the island's 
attractiveness as a profitable investment site for U.S. firms. 
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the planning priorities were 
elegantly simple: to harness domestic resources for industriali-
zation and counteract the destabilizing social effects of rapid 
economic change. Since planners were confident that the increased 
employment generated by Operation Bootstrap would signi-
ficantly increase the income, expenditures for social welfare and 
public housing ranked very low in their development priorities 
(Santana Rabell1984). 
The PPD devised a developmental ideology that depicted 
the colonial state as rising above the material interests of capital 
and labor, and engaged in a process of social reconstruction for 
the realization of collective well-being.lt assiduously cultivated 
the image of the state as harmoniously and productively mediating 
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the relations between capital and labor. Moderately progressive 
labor legislation, significant job creation in the public sector and 
extensive mediation of industrial labor relations imparted 
substance to the ideology. Through these measures the PPD 
garnered widespread labor union support and was able to super-
vise a lengthy period of peaceful industrial labor relations (Caban 
1984). 
Once ELA was established, PPD strategists used it as a 
foundation from which to launch a relentless campaign to 
"perfect" the Commonwealth relation (Caban 1993). On 23 March 
1959, less than seven years after the proclamation of ELA, Puerto 
Rico's Resident Commissioner introduced legislation in Congress 
to amend Public Law 600. But persistent Congressional opposition 
to the implicit claim of sovereignty contained in the bill forced 
the PPD to substitute a substantially revised measure later that 
year (see Bhana 197 5: 177 -186). The U.S. Congress also opposed 
any changes in legislation that abridged the federal government's 
constitutional authority to regulate Puerto Rican affairs. After two 
years of uneventful legislative activity in Congress, the measure 
died quietly in early 1961. In 1967, amid deteriorating economic 
conditions, internal PPD rifts over development strategies and 
the growing popular appeal for the statehood movement, the PPD-
controlled legislature approved a bill to conduct a plebiscite on 
status. Unlike its predecessor in 1952, the 1967 referendum was 
not authorized by federal legislation and did not bind Congress 
to respect the results. The PPD anticipated overwhelming popu-
lar support for the Commonwealth proposal, which would give it 
"the authorization to develop the Estado Libre Asociado ... to the 
maximum level of self-government" (Trias Monge 1981:245). 
To the chagrin of the PPD, the statehood proponents garnered 
over a third of the votes. The results intensified the divisions within 
the PPD and contributed to the party's electoral defeat in 1968 to 
the pro-statehood Partido Nuevo Progresista (PNP). 
By the late 1960s, Operation Bootstrap had reached its limits 
to growth (Villamil1979). The party's relentless drive to "perfect 
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the Commonwealth" was frustrated by Operation Bootstrap, 
which made Puerto Rico's economy and society ever more reliant 
on the federal government to provide social welfare benefits to 
individuals and emigration to relieve political and social pressures. 
From 1951 through 1968, federal grants in aid increased from 10 
percent of the insular government's budget to 23 percent, while 
total federal transfers jumped from $122 million to $4 70 million 
(Garcfa Passalacqua 1984:49). Increased dependency on federal 
transfers to sustain basic consumption and government operations 
were telling indications that Operation Bootstrap had failed to 
generate the promised advances in employment and social well 
being. Ironically, this dependency strengthened the statehood 
movement since as a commonwealth Puerto Rico received only 
a fraction of the benefits it would receive as a state (see Melendez 
1988:117). 
The desultory results of the 1967 referendum ultimately 
produced an irreconcilable split in the PPD, and a faction 
abandoned the party to organize the Partido del Pueblo (Velasquez 
1974). In 1968, this party siphoned enough votes from the PPD 
to result in the election of millionaire industrialist Luis Ferre as 
the New Progressive Party governor. The stunning defeat marked 
not only the end of PPD hegemony, but rekindled the destabilizing 
debates of the 1930s and 1940s over Puerto Rico's political status. 
Demise of ELA and Annexation ( 1969-88) 
The PNP's unexpected victory ushered in a period of intense 
party competition that has lasted three decades. The PPD returned 
to power in 1973, but lost to the PNP in the subsequent elections 
of 1977. Under the leadership of Carlos Romero Barcelo, the 
PNP retained control until1984, when Rafael Hernandez Colon 
and the PPD retook the governorship and the legislature in a 
bitterly contested election that year. The PPD retained the 
governorship for two terms, but was defeated in the 1992 
elections by PNP gubernatorial candidate Pedro Rossello, who 
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also served two terms. In the 2000 elections, PPD S~ Juan mayor, 
Sila Maria Calder6n, became the first woman elected governor 
of Puerto Rico. 
Each party has employed state power to solidify its electo-
ral base, has lobbied the federal government for more assistance 
or exemptions from regulations, and devised economic initiatives 
to advance their territorial status aspirations. In this regard the 
PPD and PNP behave as any other political party that acquires 
state power in democratic systems. Since the inception ofELA, 
the PPD has lobbied for increased self-governing powers, while 
the PNP has aggressively advocated annexation into the Union. 
During the twenty years it has controlled the governorship, the 
PNP was able to build a permanent pro-annex_ationist constituency 
that comprises almost half the electorate. Since 1968, every PNP 
administration also endeavored to intensify Puerto Rico's 
dependence on federal transfers, as it sought to dismantle the 
institutional and political elements of ELA. But once the PPD 
regained control of the state, it attempted to revive the campaign 
to convert ELA in an autonomous, self-governing entity. Since 
1968, electoral campaigns have become fiercely contested 
ideologically-tinged battles between autonomy and annexationist 
forces. But party loyalty notwithstanding, voters cast their ballots 
for candidates who promise economic growth,job security, public 
safety, etc. (see Melendez 1998). 
During Ferre's tenure Puerto Rico lost regional markets in 
the U.S. to East Asian producers. In an effort to check rising 
joblessness and dampen the impact on the economy, Ferre 
increased public sector employment, expanded public services 
and obtained more federal aid social assistance. Through a variety 
of inducements, the Ferre administration sought to weaken the 
PPD's traditional hold over the private sector unions (Caban 
1989). Despite these efforts, labor militancy increased and the 
frequent disruptions did menace the country's fragile investment 
climate. Moreover, the PNP was racked by internal power 
struggles and was unable to mount an effective campaign in 1972 
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against a rejuvenated and reorganized PPD. Nonetheless, Ferre's 
1968 victory was indisputable proof of an impending realignment. 
The PNP discarded the elitism and conservatism of the old 
Republican annexationist movement, and portrayed itself as a 
progressive political force concerned with the plight of Puerto 
Rico's increasing number of poor people (see Melendez 1985). 
The PPD returned to power in 1973 on the eve of a deep 
recession, and much of its energies were expended.in trying to 
halt the severe economic downturn. Throughout his tenure 
Governor Hernandez Col6n was forced to contend with declining 
corporate profits, increased unemployment, unparalleled labor 
militancy-which rendered the structure of industrial labor 
relations ineffectual-and a marked deterioration in the state's 
fiscal condition. Once in office Hernandez Col6n resurrected the 
campaign of"perfecting" the Commonwealth with renewed vigor, 
and in 1973 obtained presidential approval for a commission to 
study U.S .-Puerto Rico relations. The committee's report, released 
in October 1975 as the "Compact of Permanent Union," called 
for a unprecedented devolution of autonomous powers to Puerto 
Rico. The PPD argued that the restrictive Puerto Rico Federal 
Relations Act denied the island the policy tools and the flexibility 
to adjust development policy to the changing regional and 
international economic conditions. 
During the waning months of the PPD administrations, the 
U.S. Treasury sought to dismantle Section 931 , a tax provision 
that was immensely beneficial to U.S. corporations with 
investments in Puerto Rico. The Treasury argued that tax provision 
failed to generate sufficient industrial employment and was 
exceedingly costly to the federal government because of lost 
federal tax revenues. The PPD collaborated closely with the U.S. 
multinational corporations and effectively derailed the Treasury 
Department effort. Ultimately, Section 931 was replaced by a 
new code that was designed to stimulate increased investments 
in job-creating activities in Puerto Rico, and which permitted the 
subsidiary branches of U.S.-based corporations to repatriate 
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earnings derived from their Puerto Rican operations tax free to 
the United States. The new Section 936 was crucial to sustaining 
Puerto Rico's economic base and facilitated the transition to high 
tech industrial investments (Baver 1993; Suarez-Lasa 1994). 
The PPD's claim to a populist legacy was badly tarnished 
by the decidedly pro-business response to the crisis. Transnational 
corporations were granted generous incentives and virtual freedom 
from environmental regulations, while the PPD imposed austerity 
measures and cut government services. During the mid-1970s, 
major strikes broke out in the state-owned telephone company 
and water resources authority. During Hernandez Col6n 'swatch, 
Puerto Rico became a risky location for the foreign investor. The 
developmental credo that industrialization required sacrifices by 
the general population had lost all validity for a sizable population 
that was mired in poverty and unemployment. For many Puerto 
Ricans, the PPD had resurfaced as a technocratically inclined 
elitist organization that had forgotten its origins as the champion 
of the country's jfbaros. The austerity measures and confrontation 
with the labor unions proved highly unpopular and were important 
factors explaining the PPD's defeat to Romero Barcel6 and the 
PNPin 1976. 
Party strategists argued that economic development, indus-
trial peace and social justice were more likely under statehood 
since growth was not contingent on tax holidays and cheap wages. 
In 1978, the PNP enacted Law 26, which replaced total tax 
exemptions in traditional manufacturing industries while 
extending exemptions to firms engaged in export-service 
(Pantojas-Garcfa 1990: 149). 
Aware that the PNP was not committed to preserving Section 
936, the U.S. Treasury launched a campaign to rescind the 
provision. The Treasury argued that Section 936 was a corporate 
welfare program, and like its predecessor, Section 931 , failed to 
generate sufficient employment. Over 50 percent of the tax 
benefits went to the pharmaceutical industry that generated only 
three percent of all employment (Baver 1993:88). Moreover, in 
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light of the huge federal deficits, the loss tax revenues to the 
Treasury could no longer be justified. Multinational firms rejected 
the claims and lobbied aggressively to preserve Section 936. They 
used the threat of an investment strike to persuade PNP officials 
to lobby on their behalf (Suarez 2000:52-53). Notwithstanding 
its philosophical opposition to Section 936, the PNP was forced 
to lobby for retention of Section 936. The Caribbean Basin 
Economic Recovery Act (CBERA) proposed by the Reagan 
administration further jeopardized Puerto Rico's already tattered 
economy. As originally formulated, CBERA would have virtually 
eradicated Puerto Rico's preferential access to U.S. markets. A 
coordinated campaign by the PNP and its corporate allies 
convinced Congress to retain Puerto Rico's preferential tariff, 
trade and fiscal benefits. In both instances the PNP was forced 
into the politically awkward role of lobbying the U.S. Congress 
to protect arrangements that were at the heart of the economic 
foundations ofPPD's growth strategy (see Caban 1991). 
The economic downturn induced by the protracted U.S. 
recession undermined popular support for the PNP. Particularly 
damaging for the PNP's electoral prospects were cuts in social 
programs imposed by the Reagan administration. Reductions in 
social welfare spending intensified the precarious economic 
conditions of the poor and urban working class- a core 
constituency of the PNP. Ironically, although President Reagan 
publicly supported statehood, the Reagan Revolution undermined 
public confidence in the PNP's ability to garner increased fede-
ral assistance. Despite its avid pro-American public posture, the 
PNP was unable to increase Congressional support for statehood, 
nor was it able to materially alter Puerto Rico's dependence on 
external capital for its economic survival. Romero Barcelo 
intensified the anti-union policies of the PPD, and in particular 
confronted the well-organized and militant unions in the vital 
infrastructure industries (see Melendez 1994). In the context of 
the economic recession and alienation of public sector workers, 
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the PNP was unable to defeat a reinvigorated PPD in the 1984 
elections. 
Hernandez Colon and the PPD returned to power in 1985, 
and within a few months was faced with a new Treasury 
Department attack on Section 936. Treasury claimed that the 
provision was "one of the most complex in the tax law, expensive, 
difficult to administer and yet has not been effective in creating 
jobs in the possessions" (Brumbaugh 1988:7). Under the 
leadership of the PPD, the multinational corporations formed the 
Puerto Rico-U.S. Foundation as a lobbying organization to protect 
the tax law. Congress was eventually persuaded to retain Section 
936 when Puerto Rican policy makers proposed a creative 
capitalization plan for regional development (Baver 1993:107-
110; Suarez-Lasa 1994: 197). The Puerto Rican government 
proposed to generate $100 million in new private direct 
investments for beneficiary Caribbean Basin countries. "The plan 
was designed to extend part of the 936 tax incentive to investment 
in other Caribbean areas," and as such complemented 
Washington's strategic objectives in the region (Brumbaugh 
1988:7). 
The Section 936 debacle left little doubt the PPD had to 
develop growth strategies that were not reliant on this vulnerable 
fiscal device. The Economic Advisory Council appointed by the 
governor recommended converting Puerto Rico into a strategic 
nucleus from which multinational firms would embark on 
regionally-oriented production activities. To make the economy 
less reliant on Section 936 corporations, the committee 
recommended incentives to promote domestic capital stock 
formation and called for public investments to assist locally-
owned industries to develop technologies and products for use 
by the multinational firms. It recommended the privatization of 
numerous government operations and services, and significant 
down sizing of the public bureaucracy (see Consejo Asesor Eco-
n6mico del Gobernador 1989). However, these recommendations 
were challenged by the Economic Development Administration 
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(EDA), which continued to champion the traditional 
industrialization by invitation strategy. Puerto Rico's business 
weekly, Caribbean Business (1 November 1990), questioned the 
wisdom of the ED A's proposal, noting that "it is time for Fomento 
to formulate strategies and assume a strong leadership position 
in stimulating investment, economic growth and job creation in 
other sectors of the island's economy." By 1989, the EDA's 
strategy had prevailed, although some minor initiatives inspired 
by the council were enacted. Despite remarkable changes in the 
U.S. economy, the PPD was locked into the industrialization by 
invitation strategy it helped devise four decades earlier. 
Reappraisal of the Commonwealth (1989-2000) 
Hernandez Colon returned as governor in 1989, but in the 
1992 elections PPD gubernatorial candidate Victoria Mufioz lost 
the governorship to Pedro Rossell6, of the PNP, who served two 
terms. During this decade Congressional attitude toward ELA 
changed dramatically. Not only was ELA considered 
anachronistic, but key congressional leaders refused to consider 
the PPD's repeated demands to revise the Puerto Rico Federal 
Relations Act. In fact, the PPD was advised that the Supreme 
Court had affirmed the "temporary nature" of the unincorporated 
commonwealth relation.5 The economic and strategic forces that 
propped up ELA for over a century were no longer relevant at the 
end of the millennium. During this remarkable decade the Soviet 
Union collapsed, the North American. Free Trade Agreement was 
established, and the federal government rescinded Section 936. 
The first development effectively diminished Puerto Rico's 
strategic significance. The second exposed Puerto Rico to new 
low cost trade competitors and undermined its competitive 
advantage. The third revealed that Congress was no longer willing 
to promote investment in Puerto Rico by subsidizing corporate 
profitability (see Caban 1994). The decade has also been marked 
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by two notable, but aborted, attempts by Congress to enact 
legislation to authorize a referendum on political status. 
In January 1989 the Senate Energy and Natural Resources 
Committee introduced legislation to conduct a status referendum 
in Puerto Rico. This process resulted in an intensive policy 
analysis of impact of a change in territorial status (statehood, 
independence or enhanced commonwealth) on the U.S. political 
economy. But, after two years of public hearings, committee 
meetings and numerous government studies, the proposed 
measure died in committee (Caban 1993; Melendez Velez 
1998: 161-201). Uncertainty as to which of the three status options 
would serve the national interest best doomed the measure. 
Legislators found fault with all the proposals for altering 
Puerto Rico's constitutional status as a territory. They challenged 
the PPD's enhanced commonwealth, which in effect called for 
an autonomous state with sovereign powers (except in the areas 
of common defense, citizenship, currency and market). 
Predictably the U. S. rejected any proposals that would diminish 
the federal government's powers over insular affairs. Mary 
Mochary, a State Department representative, "objected to 
delegating Puerto Rico authority vested in the executive branch 
by the U.S. Constitution," and considered proposals for Puerto 
Rico to enter into international agreements as "most objection-
able" (Caban 1991:19). The Defense Department also opposed 
any change that would reduce its military assets in Puerto Rico 
or compromise its dominant role in determining the island~s 
strategic utilization (Rodriguez Beruff and Garcia Mufiiz 1996). 
Many in Congress feared that statehood would ultimately 
result in a massive drain on the U.S. Treasury for social welfare 
expenses for Puerto Rico's poor, which comprised approximately 
60 percent of the population. Particularly objectionable to 
conservative legislators was the PNP's notion of "estadidad 
jibara," the idea that annexation into the union would ensure 
Puerto Rican sovereignty over language and cultural issues 
(Melendez Velez 1998:187). Ultimately, the Senate committee 
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reacted negatively because of apprehension about the political 
and social impact of fully incorporating into the U.S. body politic 
the Spanish speaking, Catholic nation of Puerto Rico. 
Independence was the most economically attractive 
alternative since it entailed the complete phasing out of federal 
transfer payments and elimination of fiscal support for Puerto 
Rico. In order to assure Puerto Rico's economic viability, the 
Puerto Rican Independence Party (PIP) called for unrestricted 
access to U.S. markets, preferential commercial and investment 
treaties. Moreover, since the leaders of the PIP would not challenge 
continued U.S. military presence in the sovereign republic of 
Puerto Rico, national security was not jeopardized. Yet, opposition 
to the independence proposal did materialize over the length and 
cost of transition period for phasing-out federal transfer and 
subsidies. Some in Congress rejected any implication that the 
U.S. was obligated to subsidize Puerto Rico until it could establish 
a viable economy. 
While the aborted process revealed the prevailing relation-
ship deficient, the U.S. was not prepared to approve Puerto Rican 
statehood or independence. The PPD sought to counter what it 
perceived as growing sympathy in the U.S. for statehood by 
emphasizing the Puerto Rico's distinctive national identity. PPD 
governor Hernandez Colon signed into law a bill that repealed a 
nine-decade old statute that legalized English and Spanish as 
official languages. In addition, on 8 December 1991, the PPD 
conducted a referendum on Democratic Rights that was portrayed 
as a popular mandate for cultural sovereignty and political 
autonomy under U.S. citizenship. The PPD was confident that 
the referendum would convince Congress that Puerto Ricans were 
cultural nationalists who reject statehood. To its chagrin, the 
electorate voted down the proposal 53 percent to 45 percent. 
The defeat set the stage for the PPD's humiliating electoral 
loss to the PNP in 1992. PNP governor Pedro Rossell6, sensing 
that popular support for the PPD had eroded, called for a plebiscite 
on political status. The plebiscite would be a non-binding 
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preference vote that would not obligate Congress to respond. 
Nonetheless, the plebiscite was potentially very significant 
because Congress could not easily dismiss overwhelming mandate 
by U.S. citizens for Puerto Rican statehood. On 13 November 
1993 Puerto Ricans chose not to alter the balance of power 
between the statehood and commonwealth forces. The 
commonwealth received 48.6 percent, statehood 46.3 percent and 
independence 4.4 percent. The meaning for Congress was clear: 
it would not proceed on status legislation given profound divisions 
among Puerto Ricans. 
Notwithstanding these seeming irreconcilable political 
cleavages, five years later, in March 1998, the U.S. House of 
Representatives, in a 208 to 207 vote, approved HR. 856. Known 
as the Young Bill, it was "a bill allowing the people of Puerto 
Rico to exercise their right to self-determination." The PPD 
implacably opposed the measure because it stated explicitly that 
ELA was not a constitutionally recognized territorial status. The 
party threatened to boycott any referendum that failed to include 
its own definition of a "new Commonwealth." This would be an 
autonomous body politic with its own character and culture, not 
incorporated into the United States, and sovereign over matters 
governed by the Constitution of Puerto Rico. Congressman Peter 
Deutsch criticized the PPD for attempting "to make a specific set 
of special rights for an unincorporated territory permanent, rather 
than resolving the status of the territory through independence or 
statehood. The PPD wanted "to mix-and-match the most beneficial 
features of statehood and separate nationality, make it binding on 
the U.S. forever" (Congressional Record, 4 March 1998, E370). 
Ultimately the measure died when the Senate Natural Resources 
and Energy Committee failed to act, so the PNP enacted legislation 
to hold a non-binding referendum on Puerto Rico's status on 13 
December 1998. The ballot included four territorial options 
(statehood, territorial commonwealth, free association and 
independence). The PPD called on its followers to vote for a fifth 
option: none of the above. This option garnered the most votes 
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and was widely interpreted as a rejection of the process as 
conducted by the PNP, and an affirmation for ELA. 
During the PNP tenure the Treasury Department continued 
to lobby for repeal of Section 936. On 18 June 1996, the Senate 
Finance Committee complained that "the high cost of these tax 
benefits is borne by all U.S. taxpayers" and called for repeal 
claiming that few corporations benefited from law (U.S. Senate 
·1996). PNP Resident Commissioner Romero Barcel6, a long term 
opponent of Section 936, argued that "while wealthy corporations 
in Puerto Rico are given billions of dollars in annual tax credits, 
the poor, the disabled, the elderly, and children at risk are denied 
the same safety net and economic opportunities that their fellow 
citizens receive in the 50 States and the District of Columbia" 
(Washington Post, 14 Dec. 1994). The possession corporation 
tax credit was finally repealed on 20 August 1996. 
In anticipation of the cancellation of Section 936, the 
Rossell6 administration formulated a New Economic Model in 
1994 that "emphasized competitiveness and productivity" while 
promoting "economic diversification, instead of the almost 
exclusive reliance on manufacturing that characterized previous 
economic policy" (Dfaz Saldana 1997). In 1998, the Puerto Rican 
government enacted a Tax Incentive Act to prepare the country 
for a transition to a "knowledge based economy." To compensate 
for NAFTA-induced loss of its markets in the U.S., the PNP 
wanted to attract firms specializing in the manufacture of high 
value products and corporate services. Although the PNP 
economic measures were reactions to the changing economic and 
political environment, two aspects of the employment generating 
strategy that have been in place for decades did not change-
heavy public investments in infrastructure development and 
massive bureaucracy that generated a third of the country's 
economic activity. 
Since its inception the PNP strove to portray Puerto Ricans 
as patriotic U.S. citizens who were entitled to statehood. The battle 
to end naval bombardment and training in Vieques was initially 
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adroitly exploited by the party as a legitimate, popular struggle 
by disenfranchised U.S. citizens. The killing, in April1999, of a 
civilian security guard by an errant bomb dropped by a U.S. Navy 
jet galvanized Puerto Rico against military use ofVieques.A small, 
but determined, protest action by the poor community ofVieques 
was transformed into organized campaign that garnered 
international support. An unprecedented coalition, which cut 
across party lines and unified Puerto Ricans and non-Puerto 
Ricans alike on the island as well as in the United States, waged 
a visible and effective of civil disobedience and incursions into 
the restricted bombing range in Camp Garcia. Although each of 
the political parties sought to exploit the nonpartisan crusade for 
its own electoral purposes, the movement remained resolutely 
non-partisan. Initially, the PNP supported the protests and blamed 
colonial as the reason why Puerto Rico was unable to halt the 
Navy Department's use ofVieques. President Clinton's executive 
order to resolve the crisis was rejected by the popular organizations 
as well as all the political parties. However, Rossello's unanti-
cipated decision to endorse President Clinton's controversial order 
was seen as a betrayal by the broad array of pro-Vieques forces, 
and fractured the national consensus (Caban 2002; Barreto 2002). 
Sila Calderon's election to the governorship in November 
2000 was widely interpreted as a popular repudiation of the PNP 
for its stance on Vieques. Her open support for the Vieques 
movement was deftly couched in human rights terms, and parlayed 
into a emotive defense of Puerto Rican national identity. 
According to Calderon, "We are Puerto Ricans who are U.S. 
citizens, we are not U.S. citizens who happen to be Puerto Ricans. 
We are Puerto Ricans first" (Caban 2001). The resurgence of 
Puerto Rican national pride has been a source of indignation for 
many in Congress. 
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Summary Conclusion 
Although brief, the period of military rule fundamentally 
altered the political landscape and rules of the game. At the turn 
of the century, Puerto Rico's political parties primarily represented 
the interests of the country's leading economic and social actors. 
Although they were ideologically similar, the Federal and 
Republican parties nonetheless developed radically different 
approaches in their dealings with the new colonizer. Conscious 
that they could work more easily with the annexationist 
Republican Party than the autonomy minded Federal Party, the 
U.S. governor generals deliberately sought to erode the influence 
of the Federals, unquestionably the dominant political force, while 
they promoted the fortunes of the Republicans party. 
During the Foraker period, the division between 
annexationist and autonomy tendencies was heightened, and 
ideological differences that reflected class distinctions and 
emerging national identity issues became evident. The Socialist 
Party emerged as a working class movement that repudiated the 
Federal party, which it considered elitist and a vestige of the 
Spanish period of agrarian rule. On the eve of U.S. entry into 
World War I, prominent members of the Union party who 
frustrated by the federal government's refusal to alter the colo-
nial subordination became particularly vocal independence 
advocates. Elite resistance and labor militancy hindered the efforts 
of U.S. colonial officials. But cleavages along class and 
ideological lines did stifle the development of an island-wide 
resistance to colonial tutelage. Nonetheless, the signs of 
dissatisfaction with colonial rule were unmistakable. 
These developments set the context for the third phase, which 
was characterized by liberalization of the colonial regime, the 
grant of U.S. citizenship and new coalition building across party 
lines. While local input into the political process was increased, 
the central government did not diminish its oversight and control 
of colonial affairs. Prominent Republicans, disgusted with 
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oppressive and inflexible colonial rule, abandoned their party and 
forged an alliance with the Union. This Alianza continued to 
agitate for further liberalization of the regime. Those Republicans 
who remained committed to annexation as a state formed a 
coalition with the statehood-oriented Socialist Party. By 1928, 
the Coalici6n, which had worked productively with the colonial 
authorities, displaced the Alianza and dominated the local political 
process. The 1917 Jones Act established a new state structure 
that held out the promise of increased representation and 
accountability. But after a dozen years, the state proved 
demonstrably unequal to tasks of guiding the economy and 
controlling the excesses of the sugar kingdom. U.S. officials 
realized the colonial regime was loosing its legitimacy and 
capacity to preserve social order. 
The arrival of the Roosevelt administration inaugurated the 
fourth phase. During the decade of 1930, Washington wrestled 
with the reality of a leadership vacuum that hampered its ability 
to deter further deterioration of the economic and political 
situation in Puerto Rico. It intervened directly and decisively in 
colonial affairs to an extent not seen since the period of military 
rule. In order to promote equity-based development and ameliorate 
social decomposition, the Roosevelt administration created a 
federal bureaucracy which virtually rivaled the existing colonial 
state in size and resources. During this troubled decade, the 
entrenched Coalici6n was unopposed and worked closely with 
U.S. colonial officers, unhampered by a deeply fragmented Liberal 
Party. The federal government's efforts to employ the PRRA as a 
base for an alternative political force comprised of progressive, 
but disaffected members of the Liberal party were frustrated by a 
series of factors, including the emergence of the revolutionary 
Nationalist Party. 
But in 1940, the Liberal dissidents resurfaced as the PPD, a 
popular movement that coalesced an array of disaffected forces, 
including advocates of independence, labor organizations and the 
impoverished rural labor force. Cognizant of the inevitability of 
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the country's entry into World War II and eager to impose stability 
in the strategically significant, but troubled colony, U.S. officials 
sanctioned the activities of the PPD. The party's leadership deftly 
balanced the demands of workers and anti -colonial forces with 
the strategic and economic interests of the United States, holding 
out the promise of independence while expressing its unwavering 
allegiance to the war effort. The PPD effected the transition from 
an internally oriented, but war-based economy into 
industrialization program financed by external capital. The 
political and social costs to engineer this change were significant, 
including suppression of independence forces, large scale 
emigration and the virtually complete denationalization of the 
economy. Yet, the PPD retained control of the state until1968, in 
large measure because of the absence of a viable political 
opposition and generous federal government subsidies. During 
this period of extended rule, the PPD never abandoned its quest 
to expand Puerto Rico's self-governing powers and continuously 
lobbied for federal legislation to alter the island's territorial status 
as an insular possession. 
With the eclipse of PPD hegemony in 1968, Puerto Rican 
politics entered a phase of sustained party competition as 
Commonwealth and statehood forces fought closely contested 
electoral battles for control of the governorship and legislature. 
By 1992, the urgency and political drama. of Puerto Rico's 
seemingly endless struggle for political independence and social 
democracy had diminished. As politics became routinized, the 
state took on a new role as the object of intense political struggle. 
With its ample budget, control of billions of dollars of federal 
subsidies and extensive powers, the state was not only the single 
largest employer, but it was pivotal for the economic fortunes of 
local business interests. While the PPD and PNP advocated 
different resolutions for Puerto Rico's territorial status, it was 
becoming increasingly difficult to distinguish them ideologically. 
One outcome of the emergence of the PNP as a viable alternative 
to the PPD was renewed congressional interest in authorizing a 
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referendum on Puerto Rico's political status. The Executive 
Branch also began to reassess the costs of its fiscal policies that 
had converted the island into a lucrative investment site for capital 
rich U.S. multinational corporations. 
What distinguishes the final phase is that the PNP had to 
contend with dramatically altered global economic and political 
changes that directly affected Puerto Rico's role within the U.S. 
system. The collapse of the Soviet Union and its East European 
satellites, the end of Central American insurrections and 
deterioration of Cuban influence in the hemisphere diminished 
Puerto Rico's perceived strategic significance. At the risk of 
undermining the Puerto Rican economy, Congress acted to rescind 
Section 936, which had benefited a handful of multinational 
corporations with overseas operations in the island. While it 
also revealed its frustration with ELA, Congress made evident 
that it opposed statehood. Puerto Rico's economic and strategic 
value to the United States continued to wane during the period of 
PNPrule. 
With the phasing out of its longstanding fiscal prop, the 
economic growth options available to the PNP were extremely 
limited. The management of the colony by domestic political 
forces had been routinized into a relatively predictable range of 
activities. The PNP, as had the PPD,expended millions of dollars 
retaining prestigious law firms and influential lobbyists in an effort 
to extract concessions and favorable decisions from the legislators 
and executive officers. Demands for increased federal transfers, 
expansion of public sector activities and a resurgence of the 
politics of territorial status were the central concerns of the PNP 
during this troubled period. Revelations of massive graft and 
corruption and federal prosecutions not only tarnished the image 
of the PNP, but undermined the legitimacy of the state. The 1990s 
made evident the utter routinization of status politics in Puerto 
Rico, and the declining relevance of the state for U.S. objectives 
in the region. 
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By the end of the 1990s, Puerto Rican politics on the island 
was visibly influenced by the activities and the growing political 
engagement of Puerto Ricans in the U.S. electoral politics. Puerto 
Rican Congress people (Luis Gutierrez, Nydia Velazquez and Jose 
Serrano) challenged the Resident Commissioner as the sole 
representative voice for Puerto Rico. Their activities influenced 
the federal government's assessment of Puerto Rico-U.S. 
relations, particularly on the issue ofVieques. The unity of Puerto 
Ricans in Puerto Rico and the United States for ending U.S. naval 
use of the island of Vieques was unprecedented and revealed the 
increasing political salience of the Puerto Rican constituency. The 
perception among U.S. policy makers that issues that affect Puerto 
Rico resonate with the Latino population of the United States 
injects a new dimension to the study of Puerto Rico-U.S. relations. 
The state in Puerto Rico has evolved from an autocratic 
military regime that was imposed on a subject people, into a 
republican government with an expansive bureaucracy that has 
attained substantial autonomy over insular affairs. The context in 
which U.S. colonial policy was framed over a century ago has 
been radically altered, and Puerto Rico's role within the empire 
has undergone a profound redefinition. The state has evolved in 
the context of a continuous stream of changes in the U.S. political 
economy, regional and global transformations, and a vibrant 
domestic political process in which coalitions and political parties 
have exercised significant influence in the conduct of the colonial 
state. 
Now the twin forces that have driven U.S. policy toward 
Puerto Rico during the last century are dissipating. U.S. national 
security considerations-from confronting European expansion 
into the Caribbean to preventing the installation of communist 
regimes in the region-are essentially without substance since 
the collapse of the Soviet Union. The internationalization of ca-
pital and the emergence of new trading regimes have undermined 
Puerto Rico's economic significance for U.S. corporations. 
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The state in Puerto Rico has gradually been trl;lllsformed into 
an instrument to advance the status aspirations of the political 
party that has captured the governorship. Consequently, the state 
is loosing its capacity to mediate, manage and represent the 
changing expressions and aspirations of the Puerto Rican 
population. Control of the state is portrayed by the dominant 
political parties as essential to effect a transition in territorial sta-
tus, which is necessary in order to effect improvements in the 
economy and society. Puerto Rico enters the third millennium as 
a colony whose dominant political forces are enmeshed in a 
century old struggle to convince the United States to erase 
colonialism as one of the last vestiges of the American century. 
The political leadership insists that the crisi~ of govemability is a 
function of colonialism. For many Puerto Ricans this relentless 
pursuit of status change is anachronistic and irrelevant given the 
multitude of social and economic problems that plague Puerto 
Rico. 
A distinctive cultural nationalism is unfolding in contempo-
rary Puerto Rico which appears to disassociate the issue of terri-
torial status from national identity. No party can lay claim that it 
is the consciousness of Puerto Rican national identity. Given this 
emerging consciousness which lies outside the traditional political 
process, the relevance of the state as an integrative institution is 
under challenge. This cultural nationalism is not necessarily anti-
American or pro independence. But it is most definitely based on 
the notion that despite being a territorial possession, Puerto Rico 
and its people possess political rights that transcend and challenge 
the formal-legal parameters of colonial rule. This emerging 
identity lays bare the claim that the state is the only institution 
that can interpose itself between civil society and the metropolitan 
state and represent and mediate on behalf of the Puerto Rican 
people. This novel political development has injected a new 
dimension to the unsettled colonial question. 
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Notes 
1 For this period see Caban ( 1999), Luque de Sanchez ( 1980), Berbusse ( 1966) 
and Santiago-Valles ( 1994). 
2 Some of the relevant literature here includes Giusti Cordero ( 1998), Ayala 
(1999), and Garcia-Muiiiz (1996). 
3 A selective list of the works on the establishment of the commonwealth of 
Puerto Rico and the United States-United Nations exchanges over Puerto 
Rico's territorial status include Garcfa Muniz (1984), Trias Monge (1980), 
Bhana (1975), Torruella (1985), Rivera Ramos (2001), Fern6s Isern (1974) 
and Robert A. Pastor ( 1985). 
4 These included exemptions from federal taxation, a common monetary 
system, inclusion in U.S. customs area, provisions for the collection and 
return of excise taxes, access to U.S. financial markets, special treatment 
under federal tax laws, insular maritime legislation, partial exemption from 
the Fair Labor Standards Act, prohibitions against commercial treaties with 
foreign nations, direct federal transfers to individuals and the public 
bureaucracy, and application of Taft-Hartley legislation. The federal 
government retained control over monetary and trade policy, mandated the 
exclusive use ofU .S. flag carriers for ocean-based trade, and kept the original 
Foraker Act provisions that authorized the colonial administration to establish 
a tax system. 
5 Robert J. Lagomarsino Statement, U.S. House: Committee on Resources: 
Hearings H.R. 856; 19 March 1997. Representative Doolittle on 26 June 
2000 criticized the commonwealth "is a drain on the American taxpaying 
public. Its status is an affront to our constitutional system of government." 
U.S. House, Congressional Record, 26 June 2000 (E1113). 
